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BUSTED BENEFITS—THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT HONORS
EXPLICIT CONTRACTUAL TERMS OF UNITED’S
MILEAGEPLUS BENEFITS PROGRAM
ABIGAIL STORM*
IN LAGEN V. UNITED CONTINENTAL HOLDINGS, INC., theSeventh Circuit held that (1) United Airlines’ “Million-Mile
Flyer” program did not create a separate contract from the Mile-
agePlus Program (formerly known as “Mileage Plus”)1; and (2)
the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act2 (ADA) preempts common
law claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing arising from complaints about frequent-flyer re-
wards programs.3 For these reasons, the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed the district court’s grant of United’s Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment.4 Though Circuit Judge Hamilton preferred
that United “defend[ ] this lawsuit honorably” in a jury trial, his
dissent relies on passionate sympathy rather than on well-estab-
lished law.5 And although United’s actions leading up to the
plaintiff’s claim may not be agreeable, the Seventh Circuit’s
holding in this case correctly applied basic principles of contract
law, as well as honored the explicit language and purpose of the
ADA.6
The named plaintiff, a member of United Airlines’ Mile-
agePlus program, brought a putative class action against the de-
fendants, United Continental Holdings, Inc. and its subsidiary,
United Airlines, Inc., for breach of contract, breach of implied
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2017.
1 For the purpose of this note, the author will refer to United’s frequent-flyer
program as “MileagePlus.” United renamed the frequent flyer program in 2011
by deleting the space between “Mileage” and “Plus.” Amended Class Action Com-
plaint at 5, Lagen v. United Cont’l Holdings, Inc., 774 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 2014)
(No. 12 C 4056).
2 49 U.S.C. § 41713 (2012).
3 Lagen, 774 F.3d at 1127–28.
4 Id. at 1128.
5 Id. at 1129–32 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
6 Id. at 1127–28 (majority opinion).
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covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrich-
ment.7 For a breach of contract claim to survive a motion for
summary judgment, the plaintiff must offer proof of “(1) the
existence of a valid and enforceable contract; (2) performance
by the plaintiff; (3) breach of contract by the defendant; and (4)
resultant injury to the plaintiff.”8 In the present case, the plain-
tiff alleged that he and the defendant formed a contract sepa-
rate from the original MileagePlus agreement.9 He argued that
United made a unilateral offer of lifetime benefits to program
members who flew 1,000,000 miles on United flights, and he
subsequently accepted that offer by actually flying 1,000,000
miles.10 Additionally, the plaintiff maintains that United’s post-
merger restructuring of the frequent flyer program, which ei-
ther reduced or omitted so-called “lifetime benefits” to Million-
Mile Flyer status members, resulted in a breach of a separate,
unilateral contract formed between the class of Million-Mile Fly-
ers and United Airlines.11
Since 1981, United Airlines has allowed customers to join its
MileagePlus program if they “(1) acknowledge that they have
read and understood the MileagePlus Program Rules, and (2)
agree to be bound by those Rules.”12 This program allows cus-
tomers to take advantage of rewards such as upgrades of in-flight
seating and free flights in exchange for frequently flying with
United.13 Most importantly, the MileagePlus Program rules gov-
erning the benefits have always permitted United to unilaterally
refashion the terms of the program, even without notice.14
These rules were in place in 1993 when plaintiff joined the Mile-
agePlus Program, in 1997 when United announced the new Mil-
lion-Mile Flyer status, and in 2006 when plaintiff became a
Million-Mile Flyer.15
7 Id. at 1125, 1128; Amended Class Action Complaint at 9–12, Lagen v. United
Cont’l Holdings, Inc., 774 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 12 C 4056).
8 Zirp-Burnham, LLC v. E. Terrell Assocs., Inc., 826 N.E.2d 430, 439 (quoting
Henderson-Smith & Assocs., Inc. v. Nahamani Family Serv. Ctr., Inc., 752 N.E.2d
33, 43 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
9 Lagen, 774 F.3d at 1125.
10 Id. at 1126.
11 Id.
12 Brief of the Defendant-Appellees at 3, Lagen v. United Cont’l Holdings,
Inc., 774 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-1375).
13 Lagen, 774 F.3d at 1125.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 1126.
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After United’s 2011 merger with Continental, the airline re-
formed the program’s annual status levels.16 After the merger, a
Million-Mile Flyer, previously classified under the mid-level Pre-
mier Executive status, became a Premier Gold level member—
the third-highest tier in a four-tier system that requires 50,000
miles annually.17 Under the pre-merger program, Premier Exec-
utives received credit “representing the miles they actually flew
plus a 100% bonus on top of actual mileage,” superior priority
for upgrades, and “two annual regional upgrades and three one-
time, system-wide upgrades.”18 Post-merger, Premier Gold level
members receive a 50% bonus on miles actually flown and do
not have access to regional or system-wide upgrades.19
In this suit, plaintiff George Lagen filed a complaint on behalf
of himself and the class of Million-Mile Flyers against the defen-
dant airline alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and unjust enrich-
ment.20 The defendant filed a motion to dismiss that was denied
as to the breach of contract claim but granted as to the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing and unjust enrichment claims.21
The district court granted the defendant’s Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment under Rule 56(a).22 That court held that
the plaintiff did not produce any evidence that United Airlines
made him or other class members an offer to partake in a sepa-
rate frequent flyer program.23 To conclude, the district court
provided that the plaintiff’s evidence was insufficiently vague
and he failed to prove that the programs were “separate and
distinct.”24 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court’s grant of United’s Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment.25
The Seventh Circuit reviewed the holding of the district court





20 Id. at 1125.
21 Lagen v. United Cont’l Holdings, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 2d 912, 913, 919 (N.D.
Ill. 2013).
22 Lagen v. United Cont’l Holdings, Inc., No. 12 C 4056, 2014 WL 258756, at
*1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2014).
23 Id. at *3.
24 Id. at *2.
25 Lagen, 774 F.3d at 1125.
26 Id. at 1127.
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considered whether the plaintiff presented “specific facts show-
ing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”27 However, the court
found that the plaintiff could not even produce sufficient evi-
dence to prove the first element of a breach of contract claim.28
Specifically, the court found that the plaintiff did not have a
separate contract as a Million-Mile Flyer that was different from
the contract between MileagePlus members and United Air-
lines.29 Though the rules of the MileagePlus program do not
expressly mention the Million-Mile Flyer program, the court ex-
pressed that this only shows that these rules do not address every
minute detail of each level within the program, not that each
level falls outside the governing hands of the rules.30 The court
notes that additional evidence existed that weighed in favor of
United’s argument that only one contract existed, which is gov-
erned by the MileagePlus guidelines.31 Such evidence includes:
(1) advertisements by United that specify only MileagePlus
members are qualified to become Million-Mile Flyers; (2) the
1997 Friendly Skies Newsletter announcing the Million-Mile Flyer
program stated that the new reward program was for “Mileage
Plus members;” (3) congratulatory emails to new Million-Mile
Flyers that list “United Mileage Plus” as the sender; (4) those
same emails references MileagePlus terms and conditions; (5)
United’s website contains information about Million-Mile Flyer
rewards under the title of MileagePlus; and (6) a member’s Mil-
lion-Mile Flyer status is recorded on the MileagePlus member’s
card.32
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit found that the plaintiff’s ar-
gument that United’s advertising practice may be misleading or
fraudulent is preempted by the ADA.33 This Act preempts claims
for the breach of a state-enforced covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.34 Most importantly, the Seventh Circuit followed
the Supreme Court’s ruling that the ADA “pre-empts the States
from prohibiting allegedly deceptive airline fare advertisements
through enforcement of their general consumer protection stat-
27 Seng-Tiong Ho v. Taflove, 648 F.3d 489, 496 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting An-
derson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986)).





33 Id. at 1128; see 49 U.S.C. § 41713 (2012).
34 See Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422, 1432 (2014).
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utes.”35 The ADA does not grant airlines blanket permission to
lie or mislead customers; it redirects such complaints to the De-
partment of Transportation, which is the agency that regulates
these activities.36 The Seventh Circuit simply followed well-estab-
lished law and honored the existent statutory scheme by ruling
that the remainder of the plaintiff’s claims were preempted.37
Contrary to the majority opinion, Judge Hamilton’s dissent
calls for a reversal of summary judgment to allow the plaintiff to
present his claims to a jury.38 The dissent believes that a second,
distinct contract was formed either by option or unilateral con-
tract because United offered benefits “invit[ing] acceptance by
conduct, and acceptance by conduct is sufficient to form a bind-
ing contract.”39 Further, the dissent avers that the introduction
of the Million-Mile Flyer status “trumps” United’s reservation of
its right to modify the structure of the MileagePlus program, in-
cluding the right to change benefits.40 The dissent opines that
there is at least a factual question as to whether a reasonable
United customer would have believed his lifetime benefits were
subject to the rules and guidelines of the MileagePlus pro-
gram.41 Lastly, the dissent contends that because the ADA
preempts “claims under state consumer protection laws,” the
plaintiff should be allowed to sue United for breach of contract
to “enforce commitments” that United willingly undertook.42
Additionally, the dissent disagreed with the majority’s balanc-
ing of evidence in deciding whether a reasonable customer
would have known that the Million-Mile Flyer status was part of
the MileagePlus program and the majority’s apprehensiveness
about creating a “slippery slope” effect by allowing similar law-
suits to proceed.43 Judge Hamilton discredits the evidence that
customers should have known the Million-Mile Flyer was not
35 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992).
36 Id. at 379.
37 See Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. at 1430–33 (holding that a claim for breach of cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing is preempted by the ADA); see also Am. Air-
lines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 222 (1995); Morales, 504 U.S. at 378 (holding
that the ADA “pre-empts the States from prohibiting allegedly deceptive airline
fare advertisements through enforcement of their general consumer protection
statutes”); Lagen, 774 F.3d at 1128.
38 Lagen, 774 F.3d at 1132 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
39 Id. at 1129.
40 Id. at 1129–30.
41 Id. at 1130–31.
42 Id. at 1132.
43 Id. at 1130.
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separate from the MileagePlus program.44 He insists that only a
“legally sophisticated or hyper-vigilant customer” would notice
that the lifetime benefits were subject to the rules and guide-
lines of the MileagePlus program.45 Further, the dissent is con-
vinced that the facts of this case distinguish it from cases
involving “vague advertising promises,” and the majority’s con-
cern of opening up the courtroom doors to excessive litigation
is unwarranted.46
The problem with the dissent’s argument is that its leading
points are not backed by sufficient evidence or law. While the
dissent correctly determines that the applicable legal test is
whether a reasonable customer would have interpreted the Mil-
lion-Mile Flyer status to fall under the MileagePlus program
guidelines, Judge Hamilton presents little support to counter
the majority’s finding that a reasonable person could not have
assumed the creation of two separate programs or contracts.47
The majority provides a long list of facts that would have led a
reasonable customer to conclude that the benefits offered to
Million-Mile Flyers were subject to the rules and guidelines of
the MileagePlus program.48 The dissent refers to these facts as
“sparse” and seeks to dismiss them with the plain meaning of the
word “lifetime.”49 However, simply using the word “lifetime”
does not outweigh the multitude of clear facts to support that
two separate programs or contracts failed to exist.50 Addition-
ally, it was unreasonable for the plaintiff to assume that his mid-
level benefit status formed a separate contract with United.51
The plaintiff should have questioned why United would unilat-
erally offer a separate contract to mid-status members but not to
members who had achieved the highest level of MileagePlus
membership.52 With reference to the dissent’s preferred case
law citation, in considering all of the circumstances, it is clear
that United did not make a separate unilateral offer, but rather
44 Id.
45 Id. at 1131.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 1130–31.
48 Id. at 1127 (majority opinion).
49 Id. at 1131 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
50 See id. at 1127 (majority opinion).
51 Id. at 1126.
52 Id.
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offered an additional status title for certain members of the
MileagePlus program.53
Further, the dissent asserts that “all of these facts” distinguish
this case from others in the category that the majority worries
will invite excessive litigation.54 However, the dissent only
presents three facts: (1) that plaintiff achieved Million-Mile
Flyer status; (2) that benefits for Million-Mile Flyers were labeled
“lifetime benefits”; and (3) that there was no asterisk or fine
print alerting customers that the lifetime terms were still subject
to the MileagePlus rules and guidelines.55 But, these three small
facts do not indicate that there is a factual issue to be decided by
a jury. Indeed, the plaintiff achieved Million-Mile Flyer status,
but the plaintiff also received rewards promised to him under
the rules and guidelines applicable to that MileagePlus member-
ship level.56 As the majority established, labeling the rewards as
“lifetime benefits” does not refute the fact that the MileagePlus
rules and guidelines govern these rewards.57 Finally, the lack of
asterisks or fine print only shows that United did not recognize
the need to alert its customers to the rational inference that a
status, strictly available to MileagePlus members only, is still part
of the MileagePlus program.58
Recently, there have been a number of attempted suits against
airlines over airline rewards programs.59 In fact, a similar breach
of contract case against United was filed in the Federal District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois.60 Based on the Sev-
enth Circuit’s recent decision in Lagen, the Illinois District
Court granted United’s Motion for Summary Judgment.61 The
majority ruling in Lagen should be a warning to airline custom-
ers to read the rules and guidelines governing their frequent
flyer programs and to realize that these rules govern all status
53 Id. at 1130 (Hamilton, J., dissenting); see Kolodziej v. Mason, 774 F.3d 736,
741–44 (11th Cir. 2014).
54 Lagen, 774 F.3d at 1131 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
55 Id.
56 Id. at 1126–27 (majority opinion).
57 See id. at 1127.
58 See id.
59 See, e.g., Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422 (2014); see also Kwok v.
Delta Air Lines Inc., 578 Fed. Appx. 898 (11th Cir. 2014); Hangbo Han v. United
Cont’l Holdings, Inc., 762 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 2014); Gordon v. United Cont’l
Holdings, Inc., No. 12 C 6244, 2014 WL 4354067 (D. N.J. Sept. 3, 2014).
60 See Banakus v. United Cont’l Holdings, Inc., No. 12 C 6244, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 35205, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2015), aff’d, 809 F.3d 946 (11th Cir. 2016).
61 Banakus, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35205, at *7–10.
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levels within the program.62 Further, airlines should be cogni-
zant of the language they use in describing benefits and rewards
programs to avoid potentially misleading their patrons.63 Both
of these precautions will help to avoid unwanted litigation.
“A person could be forgiven for thinking that a ‘lifetime’ ben-
efit that can vanish in an instant is an oxymoron.”64 Plaintiff’s
confusion and anger over his reduced benefits, post-merger, is
understandable. However, it is clear that there was no breach of
contract in this case.65 That being true, the ADA requires the
plaintiff to present his grievance to the Department of Trans-
portation.66 It may not be the solution the plaintiff expected,
but Congress passed the ADA to guarantee that the states would
not negate federal deregulation with state regulation.67 In 1978,
Congress determined that “maximum reliance on competitive
market forces” would best further “efficiency, innovation, and
low prices” in addition to variety and quality amongst air trans-
portation services.68 Because the states are prohibited from en-
forcing any law “relating to rates, routes[,] or services” of any
airline, complaints regarding an airline’s advertising practices
must be addressed with the Department of Transportation.69
In conclusion, the Seventh Circuit correctly applied well-es-
tablished contract law and the ADA to the plaintiff’s claims
when it affirmed the district court’s grant of United’s Cross-Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment.70 In contrast, the dissenter, who is
understandably sympathetic toward the plaintiff’s position, fails
to support his argument with substantial facts or case law.71 Ulti-
mately, the plaintiff will have to take his complaint to the proper
regulatory agency and will hopefully forewarn others to read
and understand the rules and guidelines governing their fre-
quent flyer rewards programs.
62 See Lagen, 774 F.3d at 1128.
63 See id.
64 Id. at 1125.
65 See id. at 1128.
66 See 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2012).
67 See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992).
68 49 U.S.C. § 40101(a)(6), (a)(12)(A) (2012).
69 See 49 U.S.C. § 41713 (2012).
70 See Lagen, 774 F.3d at 1128.
71 See id. at 1128–32 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
